External baseline
Scan public websites, APIs and login hosts for TLS 1.3 support, security headers, downgrade exposure and visible hybrid key exchange evidence.
Run the free post-quantum security scanA practical guide for moving from awareness to implementation: cryptographic inventory, risk prioritisation, hybrid TLS pilots, API and VPN migration, digital signatures, supplier evidence and governance.
After the basic risk is understood, the next useful action is not a broad algorithm replacement. Step 2 is an evidence sprint: measure the public attack surface, document where quantum-vulnerable cryptography is used, then choose one pilot that can be tested without locking the organisation into an immature migration path.
Scan public websites, APIs and login hosts for TLS 1.3 support, security headers, downgrade exposure and visible hybrid key exchange evidence.
Run the free post-quantum security scanRecord certificates, key exchange, signing keys, libraries, protocols, owners, suppliers and data-lifetime requirements before choosing replacements.
Build the cryptographic inventoryChoose one TLS, API or VPN path where a hybrid ML-KEM pilot can be tested with compatibility checks and a documented rollback route.
Map the pilot into the roadmapPost-quantum cryptography implementation fails when it starts with a single library upgrade. The real task is to find every place where long-term security depends on quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography, then decide which systems should move first.
A useful inventory includes public TLS endpoints, API gateways, VPNs, SSH, mTLS, certificate authorities, code-signing keys, document-signing workflows, identity tokens, embedded devices, backups, archives and suppliers. For each item, record the algorithm, owner, vendor, data lifetime and replacement path.
This inventory is also the bridge between SEO-visible website readiness and real business risk. A public website scan can show TLS posture, but a full implementation plan must include internal systems and third-party services that are not externally visible.
Start with TLS 1.3, canonical hosts, legacy protocol removal and hybrid key exchange support at the edge.
Map public APIs, partner callbacks, webhook signatures, service certificates and API gateway policies.
Review vendor PQC roadmaps, firmware support, authentication methods and fallback behaviour.
Plan ML-DSA or SLH-DSA testing around release pipelines, archives and long-term verification.
Check JWT, SAML, OIDC, certificate chains, device identity and key rotation assumptions.
Ask providers for NIST-standard support, migration dates, evidence and contract language.
The first production roadmap should map each use case to the relevant NIST standard. Use ML-KEM from FIPS 203 for key establishment and transport pilots, ML-DSA from FIPS 204 for many signature workflows, and SLH-DSA from FIPS 205 where a conservative hash-based signature option is appropriate.
Do not treat the standards as interchangeable. Key establishment, authentication, document signing, firmware signing and archive validation each have different compatibility and verification requirements.
The first 90 days should create evidence and reduce uncertainty, not attempt a risky organisation-wide replacement. Use this sequence to move from discovery to a governed migration decision with clear owners and measurable exit criteria.
| Period | Focus | Actions | Evidence to retain |
|---|---|---|---|
| Days 1 to 30 | Discover and assign ownership | Scan external endpoints, build the cryptographic inventory, map sensitive-data lifetimes and identify accountable system owners. | Inventory register, external scan baseline, data-lifetime map and named owners. |
| Days 31 to 60 | Prioritise and design pilots | Rank systems by exposure and migration difficulty, confirm supplier support, then select reversible hybrid TLS or API pilots. | Risk-ranked backlog, supplier responses, pilot architecture and documented rollback criteria. |
| Days 61 to 90 | Test and govern the migration | Measure compatibility and performance, resolve failures, record decisions and turn successful pilots into a funded rollout plan. | Test results, exception log, approved roadmap, budget assumptions and reporting cadence. |
Start with the detailed cryptographic inventory guide and use the PQC migration checklist for CTOs to turn the evidence into accountable actions.
The most common mistake is assuming that a single TLS change makes the organisation quantum-safe. Transport security matters, but it does not cover stored data, identity tokens, signatures, backups, archives, embedded devices or partner integrations.
The second mistake is waiting for every vendor to be ready before doing any work. Inventory, data classification, supplier questioning and low-risk pilots can start before every production dependency supports final PQC deployment.
The third mistake is ignoring measurement. Every pilot should record compatibility, latency, certificate behaviour, client breakage, rollback steps and ownership. Without those records, a pilot does not become a migration programme.
Run the free external scan first, then use the result to decide whether your next step is a TLS pilot, an API inventory, a signature workstream or supplier review.
The first practical step is a cryptographic inventory: list the systems, endpoints, certificates, keys, signing workflows and suppliers that depend on RSA, ECDH, ECDSA or other quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography.
Step 2 is to turn awareness into evidence. Scan exposed endpoints, build the cryptographic inventory, rank systems by data lifetime and choose one reversible hybrid pilot before wider migration.
No. Most organisations should start with risk-based pilots and hybrid deployments. Transport security, APIs and VPNs are often easier first pilots than long-lived signature workflows.
FIPS 203 defines ML-KEM for key establishment. FIPS 204 defines ML-DSA for digital signatures. FIPS 205 defines SLH-DSA, a hash-based digital signature option.
TLS 1.3 is a prerequisite for many modern deployments, but it is not the same as active post-quantum protection. You still need a post-quantum or hybrid key exchange such as ML-KEM in the negotiated path.
Understand the threat, standards, algorithms and migration context.
Map ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA to implementation use cases.
Plan implementation around public APIs, mTLS, tokens and webhooks.
Align implementation planning with UK NCSC milestones and regulated data.
A PQC guide is more useful when it is attached to current evidence. Create a free account, add a public domain now or later, and keep a repeatable baseline for TLS, security headers and visible post-quantum readiness.
Prefer to scan first? Open the free quantum security scanner.